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THE LEGAL NATURE OF A LIEN IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
M Wiese 
1 Introduction 
There are many uncertainties pertaining to the law of liens in South Africa. These 
include the real operation of a lien, the question whether a mala fide possessor can 
rely on a lien for money spent or work done on a thing which he knew he controlled 
unlawfully, the circumstances under which the lienholder has sufficient physical 
control over an immovable thing, the effect of involuntary loss of control over the 
thing by the lienholder and, finally, the influence of section 25 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on the validity of a lien in specific instances. In 
this article I focus on the following concern raised by Van Zyl J1 in ABSA Bank Ltd t/a 
Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers:2 
Sonnekus is critical (at 464-9) of the reference to a lien as a 'right' rather than a 
'competence' or a 'power'. He describes it (at 467) as a 'power to withhold' 
('terughoudingsbevoegdheid') arising from a claim on whatever ground and (at 
469) rejects the distinction between enrichment liens and debtor and creditor liens 
as real and personal rights respectively. His argument is persuasive and it would 
appear that the distinction should be reconsidered. 
In view of the above I first consider the different approaches to liens in South 
African law before providing a brief overview of liens in Roman law. This is followed 
by a discussion of a lien - as a (subjective) right3 - as a defence and as a capacity to 
withhold. By way of conclusion I make some suggestions pertaining to the legal 
nature of a lien in South African law. 
                                        
  Mitzi Wiese. LLB (UP) LLM (Child law) (UP) LLD (UNISA). Senior Lecturer, Property Law 
Department, University of South Africa. E-mail: wiesem@unisa.ac.za. The author would like to 
acknowledge the National Research Foundation of South Africa for the funding provided in the 
form of a grant that made the research for this note possible. The author would like to thank 
Prof Susan Scott for her valuable input on the drafts of this analysis, but accepts full 
responsibility for the content of the final text. 
1  ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers 1998 1 SA 939 (C) 944E-F. 
2  ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers 1998 1 SA 939 (C). 
3  Although the term "right" comprehensively describes the Afrikaans term "subjektiewe reg", I add 
the word "subjective" here in brackets to emphasise that when I use the term "right", it refers to 
the Afrikaans term "subjektiewe reg". 
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2 Approaches to liens in South African law 
Most courts and scholars acknowledge two types of liens: enrichment liens 
(verrykingsretensieregte) and debtor and creditor liens (skuldeiser-skuldenaar- 
retensieregte, also referred to as liens ex contractu).4 This classification relates to 
the source of the personal right that the lien secures. In the case of enrichment liens 
the lien secures the creditorʹs enrichment claim against her debtor. In the case of a 
contractual lien it secures the creditorʹs contractual claim against her debtor. In the 
latter situation I prefer the term "lien ex contractu" or "contractual lien" to the term 
"debtor and creditor lien" because the latter term gives no indication of the source of 
the personal right which the lien protects. In addition, in both situations there are 
debtors and creditors, though the source of their obligations differs. 
Enrichment liens are regarded as limited real rights which are enforceable against 
third parties, the third party being the owner of the thing. Contractual liens are not 
regarded as limited real rights: sometimes they are referred to as personal rights 
which are enforceable only inter partes.5 There are three lines of thinking in case law 
and legal literature pertaining to the nature of a lien. In this sense a lien is described 
as 
(i) a right6 (a personal right, a real right,7 a limited real right or a real security 
right8); 
(ii) a defence against an ownerʹs rei vindicatio;9 and 
(iii) an ability10 to withhold (terughoudingsbevoegdheid11).12 
                                        
4  Wiese 2013 CILSA 274-275. 
5  Wiese Retensieregte 178-179. 
6  Scott and Scott Mortgage and Pledge 85-93; Van der Merwe Sakereg 711-724; Scott "Lien" paras 
49-50, 60, 70; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 412-413, 418; Scott "Law of 
Real and Personal Security" 273-274; Mostert and Pope A Beginsels van die Sakereg 365-367. 
7  Although the term "real right" is used, it can be only a limited real right because it is a right to 
another personʹs property. 
8  The term "real security right" merely classifies this limited real right as a security right. 
9  Scott and Scott Mortgage and Pledge 86; Van der Merwe Sakereg 712; Scott "Lien" para 50; 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 418; Du Bois South African Law 662; Van der 
Walt and Pienaar Inleiding tot die Sakereg 305. 
10  I prefer to use the term "ability" at this stage. The problem with the term "capacity" is discussed 
in 4.3 below. 
11  See the discussion under 4.3 below. 
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To provide the background for my discussion and evaluation of the different lines of 
thinking in South African law I briefly consider the development of liens in Roman 
law. 
3 Right to withhold in Roman law 
In Roman law the term retentio was used in various contexts, inter alia as the 
keeping or holding back of a thing, remembrance, to maintain a certain factual 
situation, and a legal institution for compensation.13 In the course of Roman legal 
development, three forms of real security rights were known: fiducia cum creditore, 
pignus and hypotheca.14 Retention of the thing was a type of security for the 
enforcement of a claim. The maxim minus est actionem habere quam rem (it is less 
satisfying to have an action than to be in control of a thing)15 applied. Julian16 thus 
states that it is better to be in control of a thing and to wait than to claim from the 
debtor. In Roman law a right of retention was allowed at classical law: the 
defendant, who had made necessary or useful expenses on a thing, could resist the 
ownerʹs rei vindicatio with the exceptio doli (defence).17 The exceptio doli is a 
defence based on reasonableness that can be raised against a debtor who claims his 
thing, knowing that he himself still has to perform. Recognition of a lien was based 
on the principle of fairness (aequitas).18 The operation of a lien was very simple: 
when a debtor reclaimed his thing with the rei vindicatio from the creditor (the 
lienholder), the latter could either return the thing or ask the praetor for an exceptio 
doli if the debtor had not fulfilled his obligation. One of two possible orders could be 
made: 
(i) temporary dismissal of the rei vindicatio whereafter the debtor had to perform 
before he could later institute the rei vindicatio again,19 or 
                                                                                                                          
12  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 771; Sonnekus Ongegronde Verryking 219-220; 
Sonnekus 1991 TSAR 462-482. 
13  Aarts Het Retentierecht para 46. 
14  Thomas Textbook of Roman Law 329. 
15  Hiemstra and Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 230. 
16  D. 47.2.60 as discussed in Aarts Het Retentierecht para 24. 
17  Kaser Roman Private Law 142. 
18  Aarts Het Retentierecht para 54-55. 
19  Aarts Het Retentierecht para 55. 
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(ii) the debtorʹs rei vindicatio was granted conditionally, thus the debtorʹs claim 
for the return of his thing was granted on condition that he performed first.20 
The exceptio doli is therefore the basis from which liens developed further. 
4 Classification of liens in South African law 
I now briefly consider the most significant judgments and literature dealing with the 
classification of a lien as a right (jus/ius), a defence or the capacity (power) to 
withhold. 
4.1 Right (jus/ius) 
4.1.1 Case Law 
In case law enrichment liens are often classified as limited real rights and I therefore 
reflect on the recognition of a lien as a right in the leading cases. The first important 
judgment dealing with the nature of liens in South African law was the 1906 case of 
United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee.21 In this 
case Smookler entered into an agreement to buy a stand in the winter of 1904. On 5 
October 1904 he signed a loan agreement with United Building Society. Thereafter 
he contracted with Golombick to erect some buildings on the stand. On 17 
December the property was transferred into Smooklerʹs name and the mortgage 
bond in favour of United Building Society was registered simultaneously. Golombick 
completed the buildings but Smookler failed to pay him. On 7 February 1905 the 
court ordered Smookler to pay Golombick the outstanding amount. Smookler did not 
comply with the order and was sequestrated. The question was if Golombickʹs lien 
over the property enjoyed preference over United Building Societyʹs claim against 
Smooklerʹs insolvent estate. In this case Bristowe J22 noted the following: 
Now a jus retentionis for necessariae or utiles impensae may well be, and we think 
is, a real right. No doubt it is not possession in the legal sense, but it is a right to 
exclude every one else from possession during continuance of a certain state of 
                                        
20  Aarts Het Retentierecht para 56. 
21  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623. 
22  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623 632. 
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things. It is therefore a right to exclude the world from the enjoyment of one of the 
most important of the privileges which accompany dominium.  
The judge23 decided in favour of Golombick. This judgment declared that a lien as a 
real right enjoys preference over a registered mortgage bond over the property in 
question. Although this is an oft-quoted judgment and the conclusion is correct, the 
reason for this outcome is wrong. It can also be criticised on various grounds: the 
judge often made statements without reference to any authority; he contradicted 
himself and regularly used phrases like "we think", "it well may be" and "we 
doubt".In this specific part of his judgment the judge seems fairly unsure of the legal 
position and referred to no authority for his statement that an enrichment lien is a 
real right.24 Consequently, I argue that this judgment is not conclusive authority for 
the statement that a lien is a real right. The judgeʹs reference to "possession in a 
legal sense" also creates the impression that he might even regard possession as a 
right. Authors like Sonnekus and Neels25 and Kleyn26 indicate that possession is not a 
right. According to these authors possession is a factual physical relationship 
between a person and a thing and therefore it cannot be a right. They further 
explain that this factual situation is a legally recognised and protected relationship. 
They consider possession as a legal fact to which the law attaches certain 
consequences. 
Possibly due to a misunderstanding of the nature of a lien, the judge thought that 
the only way in which he could protect Golombick in the circumstances (due to the 
insolvency of Smookler) was to regard a lien as a real right. This explanation of 
Bristowe J in United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 
was followed in subsequent cases as authority for the view that a lien is a real 
right.27 
                                        
23  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623 634. 
24  See n 8 above. 
25  See the discussion of possession as a right in Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 125-
126. 
26  Kleyn Mandament van Spolie 346, 438. 
27 See Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd 1960 3 SA 
642 (A); Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A) 271; D 
Glaser and Sons (Pty) Ltd v The Master 1979 4 SA 780 (C) 787; Syfrets Participation Bond 
M WIESE  PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2531 
 
Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd28 is 
an interesting case because it does not directly deal with reliance on a lien. Here 
OFS Land and Estate Co (Pty) Ltd sold their property - extensions of the town 
Allanridge - to Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd (the respondent). The property 
consisted of 329 vacant stands. In terms of the agreement the respondent could 
commence with building work, but the stands would be transferred into its name 
only once the Town Council approved the town plans. The purchase price was the 
price of the land excluding the value of the buildings. For taxation purposes the 
question was whether or not the value of the stands should include the value of 
buildings when calculating the transfer duty payable. The respondent averred that 
he had a lien for useful improvements and that the property was sold to him for the 
value of the land and not for the value of the land and the buildings thereon. Steyn 
CJ29 and Ramsbottom JA30 accepted that a lien for useful improvements is a real 
right, with reference to United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and 
Golombick's Trustee. All the remarks pertaining to liens were, however, obiter since 
the case did not deal with the recognition of a lien. There was no need for the court 
to determine the nature of a lien. The existence of a lien was used merely to 
determine the purchase price under the particular circumstances. 
In Brooklyn House Furnishers v Knoetze and Sons31 the court had to decide if 
reliance on a lien for necessary expenses in respect of the thing could succeed 
against the owner who had no agreement with the lienholder. The facts are briefly 
as follows: Bond bought furniture in terms of a hire purchase agreement from 
Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty). In terms of the agreement Bond was not allowed 
to transport or store the furniture without Brooklyn House Furnishersʹ consent. 
Despite this clause Bond contracted Knoetze and Sons to transport the furniture and 
                                                                                                                          
Managers Ltd v Estate and Co-op Wine Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1989 1 SA 106 (W) 110C; Goudini 
Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A). 
28  Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd 1960 3 SA 642 
(A). 
29  Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd 1960 3 SA 642 
(A) 649E-F. 
30  Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd 1960 3 SA 642 
(A) 657H-G. 
31  Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A). 
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to store it. When this came to the attention of Brooklyn House Furnishers it 
immediately claimed the furniture from Knoetze and Sons, who then relied on a 
salvage lien for the transport and storage of the furniture. Brooklyn House 
Furnishers paid the amount claimed by Knoetze and Sons in order to get the 
furniture. Thereafter they instituted action in the Magistrates Court to reclaim the 
money paid. According to the Magistrates Court Knoetze and Sons proved that the 
carrying and storage of the furniture were essential for their preservation. Brooklyn 
House Furnishersʹ application was dismissed and they appealed this decision. On 
appeal Brooklyn House Furnishers averred that it was not enriched by the carrying 
and storage of the furniture, and, if it were enriched, it was not at the expense of 
Knoetze and Sons. Botha JA32 acknowledged Knoetze and Sonsʹ lien and the appeal 
was dismissed with costs. The judge33 referred to United Building Society v 
Smookler's Trustees and Golombick's Trustee and Kommissaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste v Anglo American (OFS) Housing Co Ltd and stated that liens based on 
expenses for the preservation or improvement of things are real rights - the reason 
being that they do not arise from agreement but from enrichment. 
In the case of Lubbe v Volkskas Bpk34 the appellant (Lubbe) had an agreement with 
the owner of a piece of land to sow wheat on that land. After Lubbe sowed his 
wheat he was informed that the land would be sold by the bank, as mortgagee, to 
cover the ownerʹs unpaid debts. Lubbe approached the court for an urgent order 
declaring that he had a lien over the land. The court dismissed Lubbeʹs ex parte 
application. All subsequent appeals against the court a quoʹs finding were also 
dismissed. Smuts JP35 made no finding on the nature of a lien but it seems as if the 
court accepted that a lien was a real right because it indicated, by way of obiter 
dictum, that the prior in tempore rule applies to liens.36 This point of view is criticised 
by Van der Merwe37 and Sonnekus.38 Van der Merwe is of the opinion that a lien 
                                        
32  Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A) 277A. 
33  Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A) 271C-D. 
34  Lubbe v Volkskas Bpk 1992 3 SA 868 (A). 
35  Lubbe v Volkskas Bpk 1991 1 SA 398 (O) 409E-F. 
36  Lubbe v Volkskas Bpk 1991 1 SA 398 (O) 408G-H. 
37  Van der Merwe Sakereg 724 fn 930. 
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disturbs the operation of the prior in tempore rule based on the principle of fairness. 
According to Sonnekus the mortgagee is enriched by the creditorʹs (the lienholder's) 
actions in the case of a concursus creditorum. Consequently, the lienholderʹs lien 
can be enforced against the mortgagee who holds a mortgage over the land and 
who is enriched by the creditorʹs improvements on the land.39 
In Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd40 the appellant applied for an 
eviction order against the respondent. The respondent had an oral agreement with 
Canadian Gold in terms of which the respondent would extract chrome for Canadian 
Gold. At the time of the agreement the land from which the chrome had to be 
extracted was owned by one De Waal. The respondent took all their equipment to 
the land and commenced with the extraction. Canadian Gold paid the respondent on 
a regular basis for the work done. De Waal sold the land to the appellant, who then 
contracted another company to extract the chrome from the said land. 
Consequently, the appellant requested the respondent to vacate the land. The 
respondent averred that Canadian Gold owed them money for work done. It claimed 
to have a debtor-creditor lien over the stockpile of excavated material which 
contained some chrome ore and two open pits. The court a quo did not grant the 
eviction order. The appellant appealed against this decision. 
On appeal Nienaber JA41 formulated the legal question as follows: 
[W]hether the respondent's admitted debtor and creditor lien against Canadian 
Gold extended to the appellant, a non-contracting party, on the ground that the 
appellant was aware of, consented to and authorised the respondent to conduct its 
excavating activities on the appellant's property - this was essentially the issue on 
which the Court a quo found in favour of the respondent … 
The Judge42 then referred to the classification of liens into enrichment liens and 
debtor and creditor liens and declared the former to be real rights, but not the latter. 
For this statement he relied on United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and 
                                                                                                                          
38  Sonnekus Ongegronde Verryking 224. 
39  See the discussion in Wiese Retensieregte 342-344. 
40  Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A). 
41  Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A) 81G. 
42  Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A) 271C-D. 
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Golombickʹs Trustee43 and Brooklyn House Furnishers v Knoetze and Sons.44 As he 
indicated in the formulation of the legal question, this case did not deal with the 
existence of an enrichment lien but with the operation of a debtor-creditor lien 
against a new owner who was not a party to the agreement. Furthermore, the 
respondent had ceded all his rights in terms of the agreement to a bank. 
Consequently, he no longer had a right to enforce his contractual right against 
Canadian Gold. The bank, as the holder of the contractual right against Canadian 
Gold, could also not rely on a lien because it was not in control of the premises. 
Nienaber JA45 implied that the respondent should have relied on an enrichment lien 
against the new owner. In my opinion the respondent was advised incorrectly, but 
would also not have succeeded in relying on an enrichment lien because he had 
ceded all his rights to the bank and was therefore no longer a creditor. 
Although the above judgments followed United Building Society v Smooklerʹs 
Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee46 with specific reference to Bristowe Jʹs 
unsubstantiated statement that an enrichment lien is a real right, I am of the opinion 
that none of these judgments provide conclusive authority for such an interpretation 
of the nature of a lien. 
4.1.2 Literature 
In academic literature as well as several judgments the term "right" (jus/ius) is used 
to describe a lien.The term "right" can have various meanings. I now briefly discuss 
some definitions of a "right" in order to determine the exact meaning of the term 
"right" in "right of retention". 
Van der Vyver and Van Zyl47 distinguish between seven different depictions of the 
term "right". Only two of these are relevant for the current discussion. First, a "right" 
can be defined as the unity of relationships between a legal subject and the legal 
                                        
43  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623. 
44  Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A). 
45  Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A) 85I-86A. 
46  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623. 
47  Van der Vyver and Van Zyl Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap 183. 
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object and all other legal subjects regarding the legal object. For example: I have a 
right (eg ownership) over a horse. This is the generally accepted description of a 
right.48 Secondly, a "right" can be defined as a legal subjectʹs entitlement 
(geoorloofdheid) to deal with his thing in a certain manner, for example to use and 
enjoy it. This could be explained as the ownerʹs right to ride his horse, in other 
words, it describes the content of his right. The correct term here is "entitlement". 
The authors49 distinguish between a legal capacity or competence (kompetensie), 
namely the capacity to participate in legal commerce, and an entitlement 
(bevoegdheid), namely the entitlement to use a legal object in a certain manner. 
Hahlo and Kahn50 also analyse different descriptions of a "legal right". According to 
the authors the different definitions of a legal right fall in one of the following two 
groups: a legal right is seen as the exercise of human will or the protection of an 
interest. They list the following as objects of a legal right: (i) corporeal things (ii) 
personal integrity; (iii) domestic relations; (iv) incorporeal things or rights; (v) 
intellectual property and (vi) performances and services. The essence of Hahlo and 
Kahnʹs51 definition of a legal right is that it is the legally recognised power to realise 
an interest.52 
In order to get to the core of the meaning of a "right" Van Warmelo53 explains that 
the law (objektiewe reg) grants a right (subjektiewe reg) to a legal subject. The 
author54 indicates that there are four elements to a right: it must enure to the 
benefit of a legal subject, there must be a legal object (a thing, value or interest) to 
which the right pertains, there must be an abstract legal relationship between the 
                                        
48  Afrikaans: "subjektiewe reg". 
49  Van der Vyver and Van Zyl Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap 184. 
50  Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 78. 
51  Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 78. 
52  "Many attempts have been made to define a legal right. The classical definition is that of Austin: 
'A party has a right, when another or others are bound or obliged by the law, to do or forbear, 
towards or in regard of him.' Other definitions appear in the main to fall into one of two groups: 
1. An exercise of the human will. [...] 2. The protection of an interest. [...] Allen attempts to 
combine the two types of definitions by defining a legal right as 'the legally guaranteed power to 
realize an interest'." 
53  Van Warmelo Regsleer para 225. 
54  Van Warmelo Regsleer para 225-242. 
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legal subject and the legal object and the law must acknowledge this legal 
relationship (for example the legal relationship between an owner and a thing, which 
the law acknowledges as ownership) and, finally, the right must be protected by the 
law. 
Although Van Warmelo55 lists the protection of the legal relationship as an element 
of a right, he does not consider it necessary for the existence of a right.56 He refers 
to the so called leges imperfectae, which do not enjoy protection.57 Furthermore, the 
protection does not necessarily take the form of an action or similar legal remedy, 
since this postulates a legal community with a reasonable measure of organisation, 
such as a state. A description of a right that always requires a legal remedy would 
negate the existence of, for example, public international law, since a legal action or 
a legal remedy is not always available.58 
The reference to public international law (volkereg) creates uncertainty. Possibly Van 
Warmelo requires protection as an element of a right in private law, but not 
necessarily in public international law. Regrettably, the author does not explain this 
statement further. Sonnekus and Neels,59 on the other hand, argue quite the 
reverse: they insist that an action is always required as an element of a right. 
                                        
55  Van Warmelo Regsleer para 242. 
56  Van Warmelo distinguishes between "reg in die objektiewe sin (ROS)" - the law and "'n reg in die 
subjektiewe sin (RSS)" - a right. Van Warmelo Regsleer para 225. 
57  See Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 247-248 for a comprehensive discussion on leges 
perfectae, leges imperfectae and leges minus quam perfectae. In bief leges imperfectae is a 
statute which forbids something to be done, but that does not rescind or impose a penalty on a 
person who acted contrary to the law. According to Schiller "leges imperfectae are ancient or 
obsolete pre-classical laws, reinvigorated in an era in which the conviction of the immutability of 
the ius civile was still the governing idea". 
58  "In die reël wanneer een van die vier elemente ontbreek, dan is daar geen RSS [right in the 
subjective sense] nie. Die beskerming is egter nie ʹn noodsaaklikheid nie. Daar is die sg leges 
imperfectae wat geen beskerming ken nie. Die beskerming het ook nie noodsaaklik die vorm van 
ʹn aksie of soortgelyke regsmiddel nie, want so ʹn regsmiddel veronderstel ʹn regsgemeenskap 
met ʹn redelike mate van organisasie soos ʹn staat. ʹn Standpunt wat altyd ʹn regsmiddel verwag 
sou bv die bestaan van die volkereg in ʹn groot mate negeer, aangesien daar nie altyd ʹn aksie of 
ander soort gelyke regsmiddel beskikbaar is nie." Van Warmelo Regsleer para 242. 
59  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 769. 
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Hutchison et al60 emphasise the importance of a legal right and indicate that it is 
extremely challenging to define a right. The authors then analyse some definitions: 
Various definitions of 'legal right' have been formulated by leading jurists. For 
example 'an interest protected by the authority of the State'. This definition, it will 
be noticed, refers merely to the legal effect of a right. Next we have 'an interest 
recognized and protected by law'. This definition gives a little information 
concerning the formation of a right. Other jurists, again, say 'a party has a right, 
when another or others are bound or obliged by the law, to do or to forbear, 
towards or in regard of him'. This definition refers in more detail to the nature of 
the duty corresponding to a right. Lastly we have 'a capacity residing in one man of 
controlling, with the assistance of the State, the actions of others'. From this 
definition we obtain more comprehensive information, though it is not very precise. 
[My emphasis.] 
The authors distinguish the following three elements of a right: its nature, its 
formation and its legal effect. With this in mind the authors then define a right as: 
... an interest conferred by, and protected by the law, entitling one person to claim 
that another person or persons either give him something, or do an act for him, or 
refrain from doing an act. [My emphasis.] 
In terms of this definition a right is an interest derived from and protected by the 
law. It entitles the holder to expect other persons61 to give her something, to do 
something or to refrain from doing something. This definition contains most of the 
elements of a right62 but refers to only one leg of the legal relationship (ie the one 
between the two legal subjects). There is no mention of the object of the 
relationship, an element that Sonnekus and Neels regard as essential. The 
emphasised part of the definition appears to limit this right to a creditor's right (a 
personal right). Unlike Van Warmelo they require legal protection for it to qualify as 
a right. This definition of Hutchison et al is a very broad and general definition of a 
right. 
Sonnekus and Neels63 explain that a right in terms of the subjective-rights theory is a 
relationship between the entitled person and other legal subjects (the subject-
subject relationship) in regard to a certain legal object (the subject-object 
                                        
60  Hutchison et al South African Law 38. [The latest edition of Willeʹs Principles of South African 
Law 9th ed (2007) does not define a legal right.] 
61  Legal relationship between two legal subjects. 
62  Also see Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 7. 
63  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 7. 
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relationship). A right in terms of this theory is always a dual relationship, namely the 
subject-subject relationship and the subject-object relationship. 
Hosten et al64 write in a similar vein and define a right as a relation between legal 
subjects, which relationship is regulated by law. The authors explain that a legal 
subject does not only have a right against someone, but also a right to something. A 
right is therefore a dual relationship consisting of a legal subjectʹs relationship with 
the object of his right and the relationship with all other legal subjects who must 
respect this right. 
Sonnekus and Neels65 are not convinced that a lien is a right in the above sense, and 
reject the classification of liens as real rights (enrichment liens) and personal rights 
(debtor creditor liens). Sonnekus66 argues that if liens are regarded as rights in the 
above sense they must form part of the legally recognised categories of rights, 
namely real rights, personal rights, immaterial property rights and personality rights. 
Furthermore, in such categorisation one would expect that all liens fall under the 
same category of rights. 
If one regards liens as rights and has to categorise them with reference to their 
objects, all liens should be classified as real rights since the object of the right is a 
thing. Liens can therefore also not be classified as personal rights, since the object 
of a personal right is performance. Although the lienholder has a personal right 
against the debtor for performance, depending on the circumstances, this right 
originates from either a contractual agreement or enrichment. In my opinion 
Sonnekus correctly indicates that a lien cannot in some instances qualify as a real 
right and in other cases as a personal right. 
Although a lien appears to have elements of a right in the above sense, taking into 
consideration the subject-subject relationship, as well as the subject-object 
relationship, other elements of a right should also be considered. As I indicate 
                                        
64  Hosten et al South African Law 543-544. 
65  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 771-772. 
66  Sonnekus 1983 TSAR 102-106. 
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above, there are different descriptions and definitions of the term "right". However, 
if one accepts the views expounded above, which are generally in line with the 
subjective-rights theory of private law, one should rethink the classification of liens 
as rights. 
A further very important aspect of rights, namely their enforcement by means of an 
action, has been disregarded in the case law discussed above. Contrary to Van 
Warmeloʹs statement that a right does not always have to be protected by the law, 
Sonnekus and Neels67 refer to the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium. The authors explain 
that where there is a right there has to be an action or legal remedy to enforce that 
right. It is clear from the general principles of the operation of liens that the 
lienholder can never actively enforce his lien with an action. The legal remedy to 
protect retention of the thing is merely a defence.68 
As indicated above, a lien developed from the exceptio doli, which is an equitable 
defence (billikheidsgefundeerde verweer). A lien cannot be enforced as an 
independent right against the debtor. Sonnekus and Neels69 emphasise the fact that 
a lien is a passive ability to withhold, which does not grant a right of action to the 
creditor. To explain the operation of a lien the authors70 refer to the analogous 
position in estoppel where an ownerʹs rei vindicatio is met with the defence of 
estoppel. A successful reliance on estoppel does not mean that the person relying on 
estoppel has a right to the thing. He therefore cannot institute action against the 
owner. He must wait for the owner to institute the rei vindicatio but then he has a 
defence (estoppel). Similarly, the lienholder cannot institute action against the owner 
but has a defence (a "right" of retention) when the owner acts. Sonnekus and Neels 
argue that the person raising estoppel has no right but relies on the factual 
circumstances. A lienholder has no right, but relies on his ex lege ability to withhold. 
                                        
67  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 769. 
68  See Wiese Retensieregte 315-318. 
69  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 769-770. 
70  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 771. 
M WIESE  PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2540 
 
The authors71 furthermore compare a lien with the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus. This exception can be raised where a creditor claims performance from 
the debtor, but is also in default. Such a creditor cannot demand performance until 
she has performed.72 The authors consequently describe reliance on a lien, estoppel 
and the exceptio non adimpleti contractus as passive weapons in the hands of the 
excipients.73 They describe a lien as a legally recognised ability to withhold, which is 
granted to the lienholder in terms of his personal right against the owner. From their 
discussion it is not clear whether Sonnekus and Neels regard this ability as an 
entitlement in terms of the personal right. For example, they describe the lawfulness 
of the relationship as flowing from "die onderliggende vorderingsreg" and as a 
legally recognised "terughoudingsbevoegdheid" afforded to a creditor "uit hoofde 
van sy vorderingsreg". It entitles the lienholder to suspend his duty to return the 
thing in his control until his claim against the debtor has been discharged. The lien 
therefore secures the lienholderʹs personal right against the debtor. Although it has 
a security function, it is not a right because it grants the lienholder no active 
entitlements to the thing in his control.74 
In the light of the above approach the term "right" in "right of retention" to my mind 
is used in a loose and imprecise way referring to an interest protected by the law. I 
agree with Sonnekus and Neels that it is not a right at all. Therefore, it can also 
neither be a real right
75
 nor a personal right.
76
 I now consider the proposition that a 
lien is a defence. 
 
  
                                        
71  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 769. 
72  Christie Law of Contract 421. 
73  "… passiewe wapen in die hand van die vorderingsgeregtigde". Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel 769. 
74  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 771. 
75  Enrichment lien. 
76  Debtor and creditor lien. 
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4.2 Defence 
4.2.1 Case law 
Three of the judgments describing a lien as a right also refer to the procedural 
nature of liens. In United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs 
Trustee77 the judge78 remarked as follows: 
Furthermore we doubt whether it is correct to say ... that the jus retentionis is a 
mere weapon of defence, for we think that if a person exercising that right were 
forcibly dispossessed he might make use of it as a weapon of offence in an action 
for spoliation. 
Again, as so often in this judgment, the judge was uncertain ("we doubt") of the 
correctness of the proposition that a lien is a mere defence. His subsequent 
exposition of the legal position is also completely wrong and provides no explanation 
of why a lien is not a defence. The spoliation remedy does not protect a lien; it 
protects a personʹs control over a thing. The spoliation remedy therefore protects a 
factual situation, not a right. If control is taken from a lienholder against her will, she 
can institute the spoliation remedy to restore control. In Brooklyn House Furnishers 
v Knoetze and Sons79 the court clearly and correctly stated that a lien never 
constitutes a cause of action, but that it is a defence against the owner's rei 
vindicatio. 
In Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd80 the court held that both 
classes of liens can be raised as defences against an ownerʹs rei vindicatio. The 
court held that a debtor and creditor lien is a contractual remedy and not a real 
right. This contractual remedy is maintainable by the one party (the lienholder) to a 
contract against the other party. According to the court the other party (the debtor) 
may or may not be the owner of the property. The court explains the operation of 
this defence: If a person (the lienholder) effected necessary or useful improvements 
to another person'ʹs (the debtor's) property by agreement, the lienholder can defend 
                                        
77  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623. 
78  United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs Trustee 1906 TS 623 632. 
79  Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A). 
80  Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A). 
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his possession when the debtor sues him for the return of the thing before being 
compensated for his work. He can defend his possession against his contractual 
counterpart on the basis of his debtor and creditor lien81 or against the owner who is 
not the contracting party, on the basis of his enrichment lien. In the case of reliance 
on the debtor and creditor lien he can defend his possession until the agreed 
remuneration (regardless of the extent of the debtor's enrichment) has been paid. In 
the case of reliance on an enrichment lien, the lienholder can defend his possession 
until his actual expenses alleviated by the owner's enrichment have been paid.82 
4.2.2  Literature 
Most authors83 describe a lien as a defence against an ownerʹs rei vindicatio. Only 
Sonnekus and Neels84 go further and regard a lien as a defence against the ownerʹs 
rei vindicatio and any other real action (sakeregtelike aanspraak).85 Although the 
authors do not provide an example of such other claims, they probably had limited 
real right holders such as servitude holders or mortgagees in mind. 
As indicated above, Sonnekus and Neels86 draw an analogy between reliance on a 
lien and the defence of estoppel or the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. Van der 
Merwe et al87 explain the operation of estoppel as a defence. Like Sonnekus and 
Neels they explain that estoppel is not the basis for a creditor to claim, but a 
defence on which the person averring estoppel can rely only when a claimant 
institutes action against him. The person relying on estoppel can never institute 
action based on the misrepresentation. 
                                        
81  An interesting question, which falls outside the scope of this article, is if the appropriate remedy 
in this situation is not the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. See the brief reference to this 
remedy below. 
82  Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A) 85E-H. 
83  Scott en Scott Mortgage and Pledge 86; Van der Merwe Sakereg 712; Scott "Lien" para 50; 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 417-418; Du Bois South African Law 662; Van 
der Walt and Pienaar Inleiding tot die Sakereg 305; Mostert and Pope Beginsels van die Sakereg 
365. 
84  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 774. 
85  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 774. 
86  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 769. 
87  Van der Merwe et al Kontraktereg 35. 
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Van der Merwe et al88 inform us that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus89 is a 
means of enforcing actual performance. Furthermore, the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus can be described as a temporary defence aiming at actual performance 
where performance is still possible.In essence it means that in reciprocal contracts a 
party cannot claim performance without having performed herself. 
Both Brooklyn House Furnishers v Knoetze and Sons90 and the literature regard a lien 
as a defence against an ownerʹs rei vindicatio. A lienholder has the capacity to 
withhold control over an ownerʹs thing until the owner has satisfied her debts to the 
lienholder. The law provides a defence to the lienholder to protect this capacity. 
When an owner claims her thing with the rei vindicatio the lienholder can rely on her 
capacity to withhold (terughoudingsbevoegdheid). The latter term is propagated by 
Sonnekus. In the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek91 the term "opschortingsbevoegdheid" 
(capacity to suspend) is used.92 
4.3 Capacity to withhold 
In private-law literature we distinguish between rights, entitlements,93 capacities 
(bevoegdhede) and competencies (kompetensies).94 Sonnekus and Neels95 warn 
against the tendency to refer to "rights"96 in a loose sense. The term "right" used in 
this loose sense can refer to a right (subjektiewe reg), entitlement, competency or a 
capacity. An entitlement flows from a right - it describes the content of the right. A 
competency or capacity emanates directly from the law and a legal subject can 
therefore not increase or limit another legal subject's competencies. Competencies 
are not transferable. The most prominent examples of competencies are contractual 
capacity, legal capacity and the capacity to appear in a court of law. The total sum 
of a legal subjectʹs competencies determines his legal status and is dependent on 
                                        
88  Van der Merwe et al Kontraktereg 413. 
89  See Smith v Van den Heever 2011 3 SA 140 (SCA) paras 14, 15. 
90  Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A) 27. 
91  See Nederlands Burgerlijk Wetboek s 3:290. 
92  See Wiese 2013 CILSA 282. 
93  Real rights, personal rights, immaterial property rights and personality rights. 
94  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 12. 
95  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 12. 
96  See the discussion under 4.1 above. 
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factors such as age, domicile and marital status.97 Sonnekus and Neels98 show that 
the competency of one legal subject can limit a right of another legal subject: a 
traffic officer has the competency (emanating from the law) to take away the car 
keys from an owner who drives under the influence of alcohol. This limitation on the 
ownerʹs ownership does not grant the traffic officer a correlative right to the car – 
he has a mere competency emanating from the law. 
Although I thoroughly agree with Sonnekus and Neels that a lien is not a right, I 
have difficulty in understanding and translating the term 
"terughoudingsbevoegdheid". To my mind "bevoegdheid" cannot be translated as 
"entitlement" because it is not an entitlement flowing from the lienholderʹs personal 
right. It is not a capacity or competency in the meaning ascribed to these terms by 
Sonnekus and Neels. Perhaps one can turn to the Roman-Dutch authority to whom 
Sonnekus and Neels refer, namely Kersteman. He states as follows: 
Retentie, is een regtmatige wederhouding van eens anders zaak, die wy in onze 
magt of bezit hebben, ter tyde en wylen de Eigenaar van de zaak, ons, het geen hy 
wegens dezelve zaak aan ons schuldig is, voldaan of betaald heeft … (Rechts-
geleerd Woorden-Boek (1768) sv 'retentive') 
From this statement the sui generis nature of a lien99 is clear. He describes "retentie" 
as a lawful withholding of an ownerʹs thing. It is lawful because the law grants a 
remedy (defence) against the ownerʹs rei vindicatio. Due to its exceptional nature it 
is difficult to describe the ability to withhold in legal terms. This is possibly also the 
reason why the courts refer to the "right" of retention.100 Because the law grants a 
defence to a creditor (the lienholder) in control of a thing, the owner cannot succeed 
with her rei vindicatio. I suggest for practical reasons that the term 
                                        
97  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 13; Hosten et al South African Law 293. 
98  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 12.13. 
99  S 3:290–3:295 Nederlands Burgerlijk Wetboek deals with retentierechten and classifies it as a 
verhaalsrecht (right of redress) and a specific opschortingsrecht (right to suspend). The term 
"recht" in het retentierecht is used in a loose sense. Although a lien is classified as an 
"opschortingsrecht", s 3:290 clearly states that: "Retentierecht is de bevoegdheid die in de bij de 
wet aangegeven gevallen aan een schuldeiser toekomt, om de nakoming van een verplichting tot 
afgifte van een zaak aan zijn schuldenaar op te schorten totdat de vordering wordt voldaan." A 
lien in Dutch law is not classified as a right, but as a capacity (bevoegdheid) to withhold. See 
Wiese 2013 CILSA 279-282. 
100  Het retentierecht. 
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"terughoudingsbevoegdheid" can be translated as "capacity to withhold", because 
the law grants this defence. Capacity is used here not in the technical sense 
described by Sonnekus and Neels, but in the meaning of the ability to withhold 
granted by the law. 
5 Practical implications 
This "new" approach to liens is not only of academic value, but has practical 
implications. It clearly separates the question of whether a lien exists in a particular 
case from the determination of the nature of a lien. It recognises different forms of 
rights of retention, some falling under property law and others under the law of 
obligations. For example, when an owner institutes her rei vindicatio against the 
lienholder, the latter has a right to retain the thing, provided she has a claim against 
the owner. Where the owner has no contract with the lienholder, the only basis for 
the claim can be enrichment. Enrichment law determines both the existence of a 
claim in the particular circumstances and the extent of that claim. Where the owner 
has a contract with the lienholder, the latter has a contractual claim and its extent is 
determined by the contract between the owner and the lienholder. A lien should 
therefore not be classified as a limited real right, but as a defence to the rei 
vindicatio. This approach separates reliance on this defence from the operation of 
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, which is historically also derived from the 
exceptio doli. Where a non-owner claims return of a thing on which a person has 
spent money or work in terms of a contract, the latter will rely on the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus101 before returning the thing to the non-owner. The extent of 
the claim is determined by the contract. There is, to my knowledge, no case in the 
South African law where in the latter situation the non-owner (the debtor) claimed a 
thing from her creditor, who then relied on a lien. This strengthens my argument 
that a lien is a mere defence against the ownerʹs rei vindicatio. In the event that a 
                                        
101  See the discussion of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in 4.1.2 above. For further reading 
consult Lamine Retentierecht. 
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non-owner (a debtor) claims a thing from her creditor, the creditor should rely on 
the exeptio non adimpleti contractus. 
Therefore a clear distinction should be drawn between the existence of a lien (as a 
defence against the rei vindicatio) and other rights of retention on the one hand, 
and the consequences of this distinction both for the parties and third parties 
affected by the existence of such rights of retention (third party operation): 
(i)  X, the creditor, has a contract with Y, the debtor, who is not the owner of the 
thing. When Z claims the thing with rei vindicatio, X can raise the defence that she is 
entitled to retain control of the thing until her claim (based on enrichment, in other 
words for necessary and useful expenses) has been satisfied; or  
(ii) X, the creditor, has a contract with Z, the owner of the thing. When Z claims 
the thing with the rei vindicatio, X can rely on the defence that she is entitled to 
retain the thing until Z has fulfilled her contractual duty to pay (in other words, for 
all expenses provided for in the contract); 
(iii) X, the creditor, has a contract with Y, the debtor, who is not owner of the 
thing. Without tendering payment of the contractual debt, Y claims return of the 
thing based on Xʹs contractual duty to return the thing on completion of the work. X 
can rely on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus to enforce the payment of the 
expenses agreed upon in the contract before she returns the thing. 
The above discussion concerns the classification of rights of retention and their 
creation. A different issue, related to the nature of the different rights of retention, 
pertains to their enforceability against third parties102 such as creditors of the owner 
or the other contracting party in (iii). Since this article deals with the legal nature of 
a lien, the issue of the real operation does not fall within the discussion. 
  
                                        
102  Despite the fact that the lien in United Building Society v Smooklerʹs Trustees and Golombickʹs 
Trustee 1906 TS 623 was a so-called creditor-debtor lien, the court held that it had third-party 
operation (derdewerking) against a secured creditor (the mortgagee) of the owner (the debtor). 
This is the only authority for the third-party operation of a lien in South African law. 
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6 Conclusion 
The discussion above clearly indicates that Van Zyl J was correct in suggesting a 
reconsideration of the nature of liens.103 A brief evaluation of case law shows great 
uncertainty and a lack of proper historical evaluation or fundamental thinking on the 
issue. 
Sonnekus and Neels in their casebook104 and Sonnekus in his articles105 are the only 
authors who thoroughly investigate the issue. They rightly show that a lien is not a 
right (subjektiewe reg). Apart from minor reservations,106 I endorse their view. I 
agree that a lien is not a right and therefore reject the classification of liens into 
debtor and creditor liens and enrichment liens with its concomitant consequences. 
This debate is not merely about terminology, but highlights fundamental issues for 
the law of property. The real effect or third party effect of liens, for example, 
requires further examination. The complexities of enrichment law are not relevant 
for determining the nature of a lien, but enrichment law serves to determine 
whether a person relying on a right of retention in a particular situation has a claim 
against the owner. 
Most authors understandably107 and correctly acknowledge that a lien is a weapon of 
defence against an owner's rei vindicatio. The law allows a creditor to retain control 
until her debt has been paid. There are two requirements for successful reliance on 
this defence: the person relying on the lien must be a creditor of the owner (either 
in terms of a contract or enrichment) and she must be in control of the owner's 
thing. The nature of the founding obligation is relevant only to determine the extent 
                                        
103  Dutch law before the enactment of the current Burgerlijk Wetboek divided retentierechten (liens) 
into zakenrechtelijke retentierechten and verbintenisrechtelijke retentierechten. The former 
enjoyed real operation and the latter did not. Even though most authors are of the opinion that 
neither zakenrechtelijke retentierechten nor verbintenisrechtelijke retentierechten qualified as 
real rights or personal rights, there were some authors who regarded zakenrechtelijke 
retentierechten as real rights. The current Burgerlijk Wetboek did away with the uncertainty 
pertaining to the nature of a lien. There is no longer a distinction between different types of 
liens. See n 92 above and Wiese 2013 CILSA 279-282. 
104  Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel. 
105  Sonneks 1983 TSAR; Sonnekus 1991 TSAR.  
106  See discussion above. 
107  Due to the historical foundation of a lien as a defence (exceptio doli) in Roman law. 
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of the creditor's claim. This defence is therefore a reasonable limitation on an 
owner's rei vindicatio in circumstances where she owes money to the lienholder. 
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